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The Pearson Report has presented the conventional
wisdom on the function of aid in the development pro-
cese - a set of views which are widely accepted by
economists and administrators. The picture which emerges
can be bld1y but not too misleadingly summarised as
In the early stages of development, the attempt to
increase the tata of growth causes an excess of invest-
ment over domestic savings, and hence a balance of pay-
DEnts deficit But as incomes increase as a result of
the investment, so will the level of savings grow, and
in time Mill rise at a faster rate than the growth in
investment. Eventually local savings (together with
the resource. which can be tapped through private over-
seas Investment) will be sufficient to meet the invest-
ment required to finance an "acceptablet' rate of growth,
and there will be no further need for aid. The develop-
ing country will then have reached the s tage of "self-
sustained growth." Thus aid, sensibly applied, will
help countries to get through this essentially interim
peciud and shmuld be organised in. smuh a vay sa to
make this period as short as possible. Thus the
orlinary function of aid must be to promote economic
growth; in so far as aid for comsumption seems to be
abridged version of this article appeared in
International Development Review, September, 1969.
2Fsllow of the Institute of Development Studies;
tiyyjth the Central Planning Office, Lesotho.
3See for example, pages 124-126 of the Pearson Report.
In all justice, however, it should be pointed out
that the Pearson Report recognises that this picture
does not cover all cases. It does-not, however,
appear to see the limitations of its model.
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t ib.' expense of aid for growth, it is to be avoided.
The coiclusion li frequently drawn that aid must be
concentraled on those countries and activities with
the greatest potential for growth.
This model is popular among economists and aid
administrators for several reasons. By suggesting
one criterion for aid (the promotion of economic
growth) it seems more scientific than the haphazard
and various criteria under which aid has tended to be
given in practice. It implies that aid is essentially
a temporary phenomenon - that some period can be seen
in the future when aid will no longer be required.
This makes it more saleable to politicians and their
constituents. Since aid for growth appears to lead to
a situation in which countries can support themselves,
it has a more "moral" flavour than consumption aid
-
morality, as Little and Clifford have pointed out, beip,g
de-f-ined it Samuel Smilesian terms. Lastly, administra-
tors object to consumption aid which, they argue with
some justice, is difficult to organise and causes bad
feeling between donors and recipients.
There are a number of obvious objections to these
ax:guzuejits. First.. aI,thQughaid,. .as the Pearson. Rpot
suggests, may lead to a situation in which many coun-
tries are able to sustain a 6 percent growth rate with-
out recourse to concessioñary finance, this may do
little if anything to reduce the gap between rich and
poor countries. Indeed, in absolute terms the projec-
tions suggested in the Pearson Report could imply a
widening of that gap. This calls in question the
whole concept of an "ac4itabIè't rte of growth. 's
any rate which does not substantially reduce this gap
acceptable, and to whom is i;ae,ceptable?
Secondly, there are a number of countries, inclu-
ding some which are loosely described as the least-
developed countries, where the optimistic assumptions
eL the model seem to have little relation to reality.
Many of these countries have a low absorptive capacity
for productive investment
- at least in the short run.
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If aid is based on growth criteria, such countries1
although very poor, will come very lowin the list of
donors' priorities. Moreover, not only may the gap
between savings and investment increase as a concom-
itant to development, but the actual level of savings
may decline. As countries develop their social and
economic infrastructure, they will be faced with main-
tenance costs that may far outweigh the growth in in-
comes which such services may make possible. If the
aid to such countries is limited to the promotion of
investment, they may be helped to build hospitals and
schools but will not be helped to run them, or to
build roads but not to maintain them. The maintenance
of these infrastructure services may thus impose heavy
burdens on budgets and the balance of payments.
A country of this kind may thus be faced by two
unattractive alternatives. It can remain in budget-
ary and balance of payments equilibrium by means, in
particular, of failure to expand its social and eco-
nomc infrastructure. But the absorptive capacity
for productive investment is frequently limited by
the lack of educated and skilled people and poor
states of health, as well as by deficiencies in
communications and other infrastructure services.
Thus low levels of living are perpetuated. Alter-
natively, a policy of expanding the social and
economic infrastructure may be pursued, irrespective
of short run growth prospects. This may well lead
to a fall in the level of savings and involve severe
budgetary and balance of payments difficulties. The
choice may lie between stagnation and development
into bankruptcy.
Even in the long run, the model which we have
described may have little relevance for such coun-
tries. Unless large mineral deposits are discovered,
it is as difficult to imagine, say, Upper Volta
reaching a stage of self-sustained growth as it would
be to suppose such a stage in Snowdonia or the Wes-
tern Highlands of Scotland if they were independent
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countries. Thus a consistent application of the prin-
ciple of concentrating aid on those places which have
prospects of reaching the Nirvanah of self-sustained
growth would necessarily involve giving least aid to
some countries which are most in need. It is a recipe
for increasing both the absolute and relative gaps be-
tween very rich and very poor countries. But such a
paradoxical conclusion follows directly from the attempt
to use economic growth prospects as the sole criterion
for aW, and to refuse to provide aid towards consump-
tion.
At this point it is useful to draw a parallel
between international aid policies and the transfers
which are made internally in nearly all industrial
countries from the richer people and regions to poorer
people *nd Teg+ons. Theae transfers 'are made In many
ways. Poor people and regions may be helped in order
to establish a national minimum of inconis' or servtes
aid may be given to encourage growth or self-help;
people and regions may be helped on the basis of an
automatic formula related to needs; or help may be given
on an ad hoc basis to meet needs as they arise or as
they make themselves heard. Although objections are
frequently raised to such welfare state policies, or to
particular aspects of them, it has become widely accepted
(especially since the depression of the 1930's) that
there is a case for internal transfers, and that these
transfers need not be solely designed to promote economic
growth.
It is easy to see why such policies, although to
'eome e»tt ac!dep1ed in the- !ont s t of lepuriti-es'
in all western countries, are not yet accepted in the
context of the relations between countries. The politi-
cal pressures which led to the acceptance of welfare
state principles inside countries are far weaker as be-
tween countries. Governments have powers to prevent
(or at least restrict) the abuse of internal consumption
ai4, but may consider that the machinery which.would be
required to prevent abuse on an international level would
involve political difficulties and embarrassment. But
most of all, international aid has grown up in a period
of economic nationalism, when policies have had to be
justified on the basis of some alleged "national" in-
terest. And although we may all in sorne sense consi-
der ourselves as "members of one another", the member-
ship tends to be very weak as between the resident of
Stoke on Trent, Pittsburgh or Dtisseldorf and the
villager of Somalia or Botswana. All this, of course,
is merely an iliustration of Myrdal's arguments about
the weakness of the "spread" effects of economic growth
from rich to poor countries.
But since the principle of economic aid for par-
ticular developmental purposes has come to be accepted
over the past decades, it is only a matter of time
before the problem comes to be seen in this wider con-
text, and. serious consideration is given to the appli-
cation of distributive policies on a world-wide basis.
This will involve the giving of aid for consumption
as well as forinvestment, and the placing of aid on
a continuing basis - that is, a recognition of the
need for aid so long as there are rich and poor coun-
tries. It is in the context of some of the least-
deve1loped countries that the problem will arise as a
matter of some urgency. Many of them are benefiting
from post-colonial aid relationships, but there is
strong pressure inside the donor countries concerned -
mainly Britain and France - to phase out consumption
aid as soon as possible. If and when this happens,
certain countries will face a crisis which may have
to be resolved internationally.
If we pursue the parallel of national welfare
state policies, various approaches could be made
to the problem of providing aid on a continuing ba-
sis for such countries, and of making it available
for both consumption and investment. Thus inter-
national minima could be established for certain
public services, and countries given aid to meet
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them. Again, aid could be provided on the basis of
some igrced formula which measured relative need. Or
aid could be provided on an ad hoc basis to meet needs
as they were brought to the notice of the donors. If
there are countries which are likely to require aid
for an indefinite period ahead, assistance on an ad hoc
basis is likely to be the least satisfactory of these
approaches. They will be inhibited from expanding
essential ar-vi'ces if they are notassure of recurrent
aid for some time ahead. If the problems of such coun-
tries are to be met, the choice lies between some sys-
tem of international minima or an international formula,
or some system combining the two.
Each of these approaches has its advantages and
disadvantges. An internti-onal minimum .. (bowevet Ldenc
fined) could ensure thatno country fell below what was
regerd as a asic level 'of- income or- seEvices It
might, however, be difficult to decide on minimum
standards which suited the needs of all countries. The
scheme might work unfairly as between one recipient
and another; a country with high cost levels would ben-
efit more from the establishment of international min-
ima for basic services than one which had kept its
costs low. Administrativ1y '%S's'tèui of iñtethationai.
minima could be very difficult to operate, and might
create tensions between donor countries or agencies and
the recipients. A scheme involving an automatic form-
ula would be easier to operate and fairer in operation.
It would, however, involve considerable statistical
difficulties in view of the inadequacy of the informa-
tidt o ideatos of need in most of t1eastdeve1oped
countries.
1WS is" l'4ne df appThdh hseL
problems are totally ignored in the Pearson Report. In
this sense, the Report is essentially one for the 1960's
rather than the 1970's. The problem for the 1970's is
how can aid be placed on a continuing basis and how
can it be used to support consumption as well as invest-
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ment in those countries where this is needed. 1f these
problems are to b taken seriously, the following ques-
tions (which are by no means an exhaustive list) need
to be considered.
First, what should be the purpose of internationaL
transfers on a continuing basis? If the aim is to im-
prove levels of living in the poorest countries, which
levels of living should be its concern? Should it be
particular social services such as health or education,
or should it attempt to cover a wIder range of needs?
Secondly, how should it be run? It is possible
that any scheme to be acceptable would have to be run
by an international agency. If this is so, what kind
of agency shouid it be, and what should its relations
be with donors and recipients? How far could or should
the agency interfere in the internal policies of recip-
ient countries? How could it ensure a continuous flow
of resources from donor countries?
Thirdly, what resources would be required and how
would they be obtained and transferred? The answer to
this must depend on the purposes of the scheme, but
certain problems are apparent. If the need is, say,
for doctors and teachers, can western-trained people
be usefully transferred in large numbers to such coun-
tries? Or would the need be better met by enabling
poor countries to employ their own people and stopping
the brain drain from them? If the need is for freely
useable foreign exchange, would this involve some kind
of international income tax, and how would this be
organized?
Fourthly, can the unfavourable effects of such aid
on political and social structures in recipient countries
be minimised? lt is argued that aid along these lines
could be demoralising or could slow down necessary social
change. Row true are these arguments, and how far could
these effects - if at all probable - be minimised? It is
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incidentally of interest to compare some of the argu-
ments about the dcmoraliing effects of international
welfare state policies with the arguments about the
demoralising effects of outdoor relief at the time of
the 1834 Poor Law Act. Even the Maithusian arguments
have a strange similarity.
Lastly, and perhaps most difficult of all, who
Shoúid the recipients be and onwhatprinciples should
they be selected? The organisers of a scheme might be
faced with the choice of either drawing a politically
unacceptable line between beneficiaries and non--benefic-
janes, or of including so many countries as to reduce
to a minimal level the benefit to countries in special
need.
Perhaps what is needed is anew mission which
wciuia v'rhesTe questions seriously, ¿M tke the first
steps towards an aid programme for the 1970's. Certainly,
they are not questions which can long continue to be
ignored internationally.
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